themselves as if they were devoid of political, aesthetic or mythical agendas, unadorned, ahistorical, demanding neither to be conserved nor vandalised, Imhotep stone is the 'falsework' of a traditional architecture, civilisation, culture. An original figure of duplicity. This metaphorical duplicity that pervades Imhotep's house of stone, these double figures, are a future promise perhaps of an archaic meaning that has so far eluded a theory of architecture.
The proper-ness and connectedness (and the duplicity) of the 'house of stone' is deeply rooted in language. The word 'masonry' carries the same double meaning. It means house, maison in French, mansion. It is also the name of one particular method of building houses (and funerary monuments.) It is the measure and means by which a mason sets out lines to dominate the earth, to make a house of stone. The root, ma-, which is also heard in measure, mathematics, map, and the making of the mansion, may be traced to the Sanskrit where ma means setting out the straight foundations for a building, and maya means a kind of illusion or dream that appears as a fabrication architected upon the 'true reality'. For summary purposes, we designate this metaphor which Imhotep 'coined' for architecture, and possibly for the first time, ' The masonry of masonry. ' 2 In ancient Egypt the Pharaoh was called the 'Great Mansion', domain and dominion of the God-King. His (or her) 'house' of stone was the duplex seat both of domestication and domination. The stone funerary complex of King Djoser 3 is estimated to have been built about the year 2,680 B.C. In the entrance colonnade of this funerary complex, the stone columns or wall-endings are over-sized, and carved to look like bundles of reeds. It appears stone was dressed in this way to imitate a traditional or archaic form of domestic construction with bundled reed columns. But this 'imitation' was not simply a linear 'copying' of an older exemplary architecture. It represents a domestic material expressed in stone. At the same time, by the majestic girth and regal stature of the attached columns, the masonry also betokens the power of Djoser, the domination by his united kingdom of North and South Egypt over the 'nine bows' of his traditional enemies. Domination and domestication, is a perennial double figure of stone architecture, an architectural metaphor which now calls to us out of language itself.
At the beginning of stone masonry, already the capitals of columns were a preferred location for duplicity. To embellish a column at its capital is to make light of the roof. There is visual humour in this expression of contrast between effort and repose, between vertical order and horizontal stratification, between the stress and strain in the heavy masonry and the lightness and repose of a limpid papyrus flower, between the demand for civil obedience and the free weediness of a leafy plant. A political message is not hard to find here. A subject people who dwell in the house of stone must Michael Linzey A reconstructed shrine in the heb-sed court also bear the yoke of domination lightly, and with stony good humour, if they wish to live under the domain of the king, if they would subject themselves to the royal justice, called
ma-et.
If the Djoser complex were built today we would describe it not only as duplicitous, but as fake, imitation, even unauthentic. Take for example its doors and gateways. The complex, covering 15 hectares, was surrounded by a 10 metre high stone wall with fourteen gateways.
But only one of the gateways was an actual entrance-way for the living. The other thirteen entrances were imitation, entrances only in the imagination. To try to insist that there might have been some practical function for this fakery-that the imitation entrances were to deceive grave-robbers for example-is to lamely seek for a continuity of purpose between ancient Egypt and today which the evidence cannot support. Throughout the complex, stone fake doors were carved in walls, open doors which led nowhere and closed doors which indicated but prohibited entry. Stone imitation doors complete with imitation stone hinges stand ajar for eternity. What possible meaning could there be for all this unauthentic duplicity?
The duplicity of Imhotep stone may have been built on a cosmic doubleness. We may be reencountering in it the long-ago twin gods, Tefnut and Shu, whose respective activities were designated in the texts of the day in terms of Eternal Sameness and Eternal Recurrence.
If we compare this duplicitous Godhead with the modern nihilism, the singular god of 'Eternal Progress' in our own time, we may be persuaded that the thought processes of Imhotep the architect were more 'attuned' to duplicity than the reductive, object-oriented patterns of rational thought allow us today. But the thought processes of Imhotep also remain a closed door to a theory of architecture.
What can be more valuable and achievable than to speculate about subjective intentions is to see the course of western architecture itself through the duplicity of Imhotep stone, to trace the historical destining of its metaphor. All architecture suffers duplicity similar to the duplicity of Imhotep stone, (suffers from it also, bears with it, and likewise bares itself to it.) Stone architecture perhaps more than any other, is heroic in this respect in its barefaced deceit.
Metaphor in a Theory of Architecture
Having emphasised the aspect of metaphor as duplicity, I want to turn now to its aspect of propriety in a theory of architecture. If a house is dressed up in stone to look like a rush and clay and wooden house, (or if a business house is dressed in the sacrificial ornaments of a stone temple,) this ought to be seen as improper, dishonest, duplicitous, even a foolish thing for an architect to do. Yet the house of stone is also, at the same time, the epitome of civilised architecture in western culture. ' The masonry of masonry' is a gross impropriety, a societal duplicity. Yet by the same token it is the proper property of western architecture. And when a figure is valued and used, when it is a valued property of a community, its original impropriety, the effect of its metaphorical beginning in duplicity, can be erased from memory, we can become oblivious to it, so we don't even think of a stone house any more as a metaphor.
But the proper architectural 'text' can and should be 'read' in terms of metaphor, not because architecture 'copies something that properly belongs to something else,'-in the sense, for example, that the limestone boundary walls of Djoser's funerary complex improperly copy the 'real' palace walls which 'rightfully' belonged at Memphis, but which presumably were made of mud, not because all architecture in a sense copies all previous architecture. Metaphor is proper in a theory of architecture because, further than this, (and in another sense which is also Aristotelean,) architecture uses metaphor to 'make one see things, ' Metaphorical duplicity is proper for architecture but improper for philosophy. Yet all philosophers at one time or another have secretly stooped to this philosophical impropriety.
Plato 'descended' to metaphor-like duplicity when he invented 'The idea of the idea. ' Heidegger 7 remarks that Plato committed an extreme violence upon the Greek language, violated its propriety, duped its language community, when he used eidos to mean 'that which in each particular thing endures as presence.' For eidos in the common speech of Plato's day correctly meant appearance, 'the outward aspect that a visible thing offers to the physical eye.' Plato exacted of this word 'something utterly extraordinary,' remarks Heidegger:
'that it name what precisely is not, and never will be perceivable with physical eyes.' Plato originally and duplicitously violated the meaning of the word idea to make it mean 'the nonsensuous aspect of what is physically visible,' whereas it properly and ordinarily names and is, 'that which constitutes the essence in the audible, the tastable, the tactile, in everything that is in any way accessible.' And it was upon this extraordinarily fertile but highly im- This kind of 'secret history of a word' is a property of all words in metaphorised language, and all language is metaphorised. To suggest that all language is therefore architecture would bring a radical meaning to Heidegger's famous metaphor, 'Language is the house of Being. ' Heidegger not only sets 'language' in a state of activity; architecture also is activated. Already released from its archaic technology, the house of stone, and now from the granite tyranny of idealising thinking, architecture is free to rediscover its postmodern propriety as 'poetry's innermost site.'8
Petrification of the Subject
The course of history, Vattimo 9 has remarked, is neither degenerating nor advancing, neither a progress nor a decadence. There is no secret narrative, not entropy, not evolution, not A first reading of the petrification of the subject can be reconstructed in terms of what historians today call the politics of death. In a culture that is ruled by a living god, as Ancient
Egypt was ruled for many centuries, the politics of death can exert a volatile and disruptive effect on the public imagination. Ebersole 13 has pointed out that although death itself is a 'given', a 'biological fact', yet its meaning is always open to be socially negotiated. Whenever a king dies or a national leadership changes hands, this is always a propitious time for political manoeuvring. When the king is also a god, his death can seem to put more at risk, can sometimes call for recreating and reforming the whole of cultural cosmology.
When the king died in the Old Kingdom of Egypt, the remains were returned to the mothergoddess, Nut. This metaphorical return at the time of death was a necessary ceremonial to restore the balance of life, which was understood by the Egyptians to be a cycle of Eternal
Recurrence. Born of woman, the king returns at death to the body of a woman. This funerary intention is clearly stated in the following Pyramid Text:
You are given to your mother, Nut, in her identity of the coffin. She has gathered you up, in her identity of the sarcophagus. You ascend to her in her identity of the tomb. (Pyr. 616 d-f) 14 To the modern mind Nut is usually identified with the sky. The sky is unavoidably implicated by association with the metaphysical realm, supra-terrestrial, distinctively beyond the earth . It can be surprising therefore to hear that the goddess 'of the sky' is identified as a primal architecture 'of the earth,' a nesting of enclosure within enclosure in the stony forms of mortuary architecture. The modern mind is adept with nested idealisations of the 'real' sun and the 'real' sky, physical realities clearly delineated and apparently singular, so that when we read that 'the akh ascends to the sky,' it is not immediately apparent that a metaphorical 'sky' is meant, that the akh ascends into the pyramid itself as its proper abode and dwelling place, there to re-encounter the sky goddess Nut, inside the house of stone. It can be a startling displacement, a dislocation of the goddess out of her 'proper' realm, to show herself as a pyramid on the ground, and as a sarcophagus under the ground. This reading of the funerary mound is not the 'high ground' or 'staircase' for a descending Epiphany of a god, as is more usually assumed. Rather it is an amniotic sac which bears up and protects the King, petrified in his limit, and an architecture which bears up stone into the sky.
The Heliopolitan cosmogony at the time of the Pyramid Texts was headed by an Ennead of nine major gods: A tum, the 'finished creation' who began like an egg floating in the abysmal chaos; his children, Tefnut and Shu, who are the 'air' and the 'dew', but also twin aspects of the 'finished creation', whose respective activities are ascribed the verbs wnn, 'exist' and hpr, 'develop'; Tefnut and Shu conceived two offspring, Geb and Nut, 'earth' and 'sky', who were also the active male and female principles of creation; their own children are Osiris, Isis, Seth, Nephthys, and Horus. Although these Egyptian gods are often represented in the forms of human and animal beings, they are not 'subjective' in the modern sense, not subject to the ego cogito. They are better understood to be metaphorical explanations of the architecture of Being, the constructive and conservative principles of cosmology, always recurring and always the same, in the socially constructed ordering of Egyptian reality.
If the politics of the death of Horus is thought and socially constructed in the double-logical frame of metaphorising thinking, the coffin, sarcophagus and tomb can be potently associated with Nut, mother of Horus. The king's mummified remains are preserved in a coffin within a stone sarcophagus in a deep pit under the ground. Subsequently the king is understood to ascend to a final dwelling-place in a tomb that is constructed over the head of the pit. And in this final dwelling-place, in the swollen body or womb of Nut, it is the king's pleasure that he may 'come and go' as and whenever he pleases:
The King's lifetime is Eternal Recurrence, his limit is Eternal Sameness. In this his privilege of: "When he likes he acts; when he dislikes he doesn't have to act." (Pyr. 412 a-b)
There is some evidence that this metaphorical meaning of the lively interiority of pyramid ' 16 But the pyramids on the other hand were petrified signs of a departed Subject.
Like so many stone arrow-heads, cast aside and forgotten in the desert, that for millennia h ad pointed to the blue unclouded emptiness of the Egyptian sky, they signified the departure from the earth into an idealised realm of some lost tribe of Spirit.
Derrida, reading Hegel, remarks that the Egyptian pyramids appear to be arbitrary in terms of signification 17 . Although a pyramid as a sign seems to point to the celestial sphere (which Hegel may have presumed to be located above, in the direction of the sky, the direction in which the pyramids are pointed,) yet its 'functional' point was to d emark the dead body of the King, which, in the case of the Djoser step-pyramid at least, was once buried in a deep pit beneath the stony monument itself. This 'arbitrariness' in the pointing-sense might be said to mark a first architecture of differance; in that a 'deferral' and 'dislocation' of subjective meaning is indicated through the arbitration of direction of the pyramid-as-sign. Derrida notes that the letter 'A' in differance, the silent device in his theoretical deconstruction of Semiology, 'is' a pyramid.
'It is put forward by a silent mark, by a tacit monument, or, one might even say, by a pyramid-keepin g in mind not only the capital form of the printed letter but also the passage from Hegel's Encyclopaedia where he compares the body of the sign to an Egyptian pyramid. The A of differance therefore is not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet, like a tomb.
'It is a tomb that, (provided one knows how to deciph er the legend) is not far from signalling the death of the king.' 1 8
By this unlikely metaphor Derrida assigns to a letter a name that properly belongs to archi- finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary. ' (p. 17 .) The subject of Lauer looms to presence in our reading of Foucault, as a metaphor for the archaeological project with respect to the subject of architecture. Theory, Foucault demands, should not be ' ... secretly ... related to the synthetic activity of the subject, ... the sovereignty of consciousness, ' (p. 14,) but instead it sh ould concern itself with ' ... the intrinsic description of monuments. ' (p. 7.) We (Lauer) (history) should not attempt to' ... pierce through the density [of a monumental trace] in order to reach what remains silently interior to it,' but should acknowledge instead that everything that is found and reassembled is fragments of a former monument. The transcendental Subject, the 'god' of modern phenomenology, the mythical point of origin which secrets itself at the centre of a pyramid, which effectively repossesses everything to itself as objects of an idealised intentionality, turns the world to stone, is another monumental trace, a trace of modernity, a modern language game, and in particular it is the culmination and end in western history of the destining of idealising thinking. The task of criticism therefore is to free theory of architecture from subjection to the subject, to dispense with 'things', to 'de-presentify' them, and 'That which has the character of destining moves, in itself, at any given time, toward a special moment that sends it into another destining, in which, however, it is not simply submerged and lost. We are still too inexperienced and thoughtless to think the essence of the historical from out of destining and ordaining and taking place so as to adapt. We are still too easily inclined, out of habit, to conceive that which has the character of destining in terms of happening, and to represent the latter as an expiration, a passing away, of events that have been established historiographically. We locate history in the realm of happening, instead of thinking history in accordance with its essential origin from out of destining. But destining is essentially destining of Being, indeed ... Being itself ... changes in the manner of its destining. ' 22 What Imhotep really constructed when he built the first proto-pyramid, was something more remarkable than either a house for a god or a colossal piling up of stone, more permanent and pervasive than any single architectural object or happening can possibly be. It was most simply a metaphor in stone, but a metaphor that became for a very long period of time ', and 'house' were such that, were they translated into architectural language, they would represent or approximate 'plans' rather than 'elevations'. The glyphs for 'shrine', 'tenon-topped column', and 'papyriform column', by contrast, which is to say, figures of stone architecture, were represented in 'elevation'. In texts written after the pyramid age, 'pyramid' was glyphed as a triangle rather than a square, indicating it too was 'elevated' rather than 'planned'.
The architectural master-work of Imhotep has been unearthed (literally and physically) through years of dedicated archaeological research and fastidious architectural reconstruction by Lauer and co-workers. But large parts of the complex still remain buried beneath the sand. J. Press, 1977) ,) specifically contradicts the principle of excluded middle. Ricoeur notes that ' ... the 'place' of metaphor, its most intimate and ultimate abode, is ... the copula of the verb to be. The metaphorical 'is' at once signifies both 'is not' and 'is like.' If this is really so, we are allowed to speak of metaphorical truth ... ' (p . 7.) In the duplicitous logic of metaphorising thinking, it can properly be said, as if one were relating a fictional narrative: 'It is and it is not so. ' Derrida expresses this rule of metaphorising thinking in almost identical terms when he writes: " 'Because" and "although" at 
